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Abstract—Many physical plants that are controlled by embed-
ded systems have safety requirements that need to be respected
at all times – any deviations from expected behavior can result
in damage to the system (often to the physical plant), the
environment or even endanger human life. In recent times,
malicious attacks against such systems have increased – many
with the intent to cause physical damage. In this paper, we aim
to decouple the safety of the plant from security of the embedded
system by taking advantage of the inherent inertia in such
systems. In this paper we present a system-wide restart-based
framework that combines hardware and software components
to (a) maintain the system within the safety region and (b)
thwart potential attackers from destabilizing the system. We
demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using two realistic
systems – an actual 3 degree of freedom (3-DoF) helicopter and
a simulated warehouse temperature control unit. Our proof-
of-concept implementation is tested against multiple emulated
attacks on the control units of these systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventionally, embedded cyber-physical systems (CPS)
used custom platforms, software/protocols and were normally
not linked to external networks. As a result, security was
typically not a priority in their design. However, due to the
drive towards remote monitoring and control facilitated by
the growth of the Internet along with the increasing use of
common-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, these traditional
assumptions are increasingly being challenged as evidenced by
recent attacks [33], [23], [35]. Any successful, serious attack
against such systems could lead to problems more catastrophic
than just loss of data or availability because of the critical
nature of such systems [13], [16].
One of the challenges of designing secure embedded
systems is to develop techniques/frameworks that consider
the safety requirements of any physical system that they may
control and operate within resource-constrained environments
of embedded platforms. In the design of such a secure
framework, it is important to distinguish between physical
safety and cyber-security. For many embedded systems,
violation of cyber-security (e.g., stealing system secrets,
logging user activity pattern, taking control of the system,
etc.) by itself may not be considered as harmful as violation
of physical safety (e.g., destabilizing a helicopter by moving
towards other objects or ground). In fact, in the context of
embedded CPS, one of the goals of an adversary could be
violate physical safety eventually and cause physical damage.
Unfortunately, many of the existing security techniques are
designed for traditional computing systems and do not take
into the account the physical aspect of embedded systems.
Hence, they are not always effective in ensuring physical
safety in the presence of attacks.
On one hand, many existing security mechanisms aim to
protect against malicious activities and/or detecting them as
quickly as possible. It is, however, not easily possible to detect
or protect from all the attacks without any false negatives.
On the other hand, safety guarantees verified by design
methods for safety-critical CPS are only valid for the original
uncorrupted system software. In other words, if security of
the system can not be guaranteed, safety requirements may
also be broken. Hence there is need for security mechanisms
that are specifically designed for safety-critical systems with
verifiability in mind.
In this paper, we propose a design method for safety-
critical embedded CPS that decouples physical safety from
cyber security, i.e., it guarantees the safety of the physical
system even when the security of the embedded system cannot
be guaranteed. The main idea of the paper is based on
two key observations. First, restarting a computing unit and
reloading the software from a protected storage is an effective
way to remove any malicious component from the system
(albeit for a short, finite amount of time) and restore the
software to an uncorrupted, functional condition [3]. Second,
physical systems, unlike computing systems, have inertia.
As a result, changing the state of a physical plant from a
safe state to an unsafe one even with complete adversarial
control1 is not instantaneous and takes considerable time (e.g.,
increasing temperature, increasing pressure, etc.) We leverage
this property to calculate a safe operational window and
combine it with the effectiveness of system-wide restarts to
decrease the efficacy of malicious actors.
In our approach, the power of system-restarts is used to
recover the embedded system from a potentially corrupted
condition to a trusted and functional state. At this point, all
external interfaces (e.g., network and debugging interface) of
the embedded system (except for the sensors and actuators)
are disabled. While system is in this isolated mode, a safe
operational window is calculated during which, even with
full control of the adversary, the physical plant cannot reach
an unsafe state. In this isolated mode the next restart time
of the embedded system is also set dynamically. Then, the
main controller and all interfaces are activated and system
starts the normal operation until the restart time time is
reached. This process repeats after each restart. However, if
at some point, the plant is too close to the safety boundary
such that calculated safety window is too short (i.e., system
cannot tolerate any adversarial behavior), the secure/isolated
operational mode is extended. During the extended period, a
safety controller (SC) drives the plant towards the safe states
1For instance if the adversary gains root/administrative access in the system.
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and farther away from the unsafe boundary. Once the system
has a reasonable margin, next restart time is set and normal
controller is activated. In our design, an external isolated
simple hardware module acts as the Root of Trust (RoT)2 and
triggers the restarts (Section IV-B). This guarantees that even
very strong adversaries cannot interfere with the system restart
events.
Notice that only restarting the embedded platform may
make it easier for the attacker to penetrate the system again.
However the dynamic calculation of restart times and other
quantities (e.g., reachability calculations, see Section IV-C)
makes it harder for the attacker to succeed. Along with restart,
using the approaches described in Section VIII, it is possible
to further increase the difficulty for the attacker to intrude and
cause damage to the system.
Note that with optimizing the boot sequence and given
the embedded nature of such systems, the time required
to restart and reload the software can be very short. The
impact of the proposed approach on availability of the system
varies according to the boot time of the particular embedded
system (type of the OS, processor, storage, size of the software,
etc.) and the physical plant’s dynamics (that determines the
rate of restarts). Such an impact is negligible for systems
with slower dynamics such as temperature control system and
it can increase for unstable systems such as avionics (see
Section VI). Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the proposed
approach on some categories of applications, in an abstract
sense.
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Fig. 1. Impact of the proposed restart-based protection increases with the
Speed of dynamics of the physical sub-system.
In this paper we make following contributions:
• We propose an approach to calculate the safe operation
window for CPS and hence, improve its overall security.
By utilizing system-wide restarts the proposed framework
can recover a potentially compromised system. (Sec-
tion V).
• We guarantee the safety of the physical system despite
security threats (Section IV).
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method
using a proof-of-concept implementation as applied to
realistic systems (Section VI).
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. System Model
The type of system that we consider in this work is
an embedded control system that drives the physical plant.
Examples of such systems include heating, ventilation and
2The proposed RoT module can be constructed using simple commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) components.
watering systems, smart home appliances, drone control
systems, automotive engine controllers, process controllers,
etc.These systems usually provide an interface to interact
with user or other physical systems. These interfaces may
be utilized for transmitting the state and sensors values or
receiving new set points and operation plans. In some cases,
embedded platforms also provide debugging interfaces that
can be used for diagnosing errors during operation or the
development cycle. Furthermore, the physical plant has safety
requirements that need to be respected at all times. Failure
to satisfy the safety requirements may damage the physical
components or surrounding environment. As an example, a
helicopter/UAV may destabilized (or damaged) if its wings
touches the ground or other objects.
B. Adversary Model
Embedded CPS face threats in various forms depending
on the system and the goals of the attacker. For instance,
adversaries may insert, eavesdrop on or modify messages
exchanged by system components. Besides, attackers may
manipulate the processing of sensor inputs and actuator
commands, could try to modify the control flow of the system
as well as extract sensitive information through side-channels.
In this paper we make the following assumptions about the
system and capabilities of the adversary:
i) Software image integrity: We assume that the original
image of the system software (real-time operating sys-
tem (RTOS), control applications and other components)
does not contain malicious components. These compo-
nents, however, may contain bugs or security vulnerabil-
ities that could be exploited to initiate attacks.
ii) Read-only memory unit: We assume that the original
image of the system software is stored on a read-
only memory unit (i.e., E2PROM). This content is
unmodifiable at runtime by adversary or other entities.
iii) Integrity of Root of Trust (RoT): As mentioned earlier,
RoT is an isolated hardware module responsible for
issuing a restart signal at designated times. It is designed
to be directly accessible only during an internal that we
call the SEI (refer to Section IV-B). Hence, we consider
that attackers can not compromise it to prevent the system
from restarting.
iv) Sensor and actuator integrity: We assume that the
adversary does not have physical access to the sensors
and actuators. Hence, values reported by sensors are
correct and commands sent to the actuators are executed
accordingly. However, an attacker may corrupt and replace
sensor measurements or actuator commands inside the
applications, on the network or underlying OS.
v) External attacks: Attackers require an external interface
such as the network, serial port or debugging interface to
launch the attacks. As long as all such interfaces remain
disabled, applications running on the system are assumed
to be trusted.
vi) Integrity violation: We assume that once the external
interfaces are activated, the adversary can compromise the
software components3 on the embedded system including
3We are not concerned with exact method used by attackers to get into the
system.
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the RTOS as well as the real-time/control applications.
Our approach also improves system security against forms
of attack that have intentions other than damaging the physical
plant. The following are some instances of such attacks
[14], [3]: (i) Information leakage through side-channels: The
adversary may aim to learn important information through side
or covert-channel attacks by simply lodging themselves in the
system and extracting sensitive information. (ii) System-level
Denial of Service (DoS): The attacker may intrude into the
real-time system and exhaust system-level resources such as
CPU, disk, memory, restricting safety-critical control tasks
from necessary resources, etc. (iii) Control performance
degradation: An attacker may focus on reducing the control
performance and consequently reducing the progress of
the system towards the mission goal by tampering with
actuators/sensors and/or preventing the control processes from
proper execution.
Our approach does not mitigate network attacks such as
man-in-the-middle or DoS attacks that restrict network access.
Also, the safety guarantees of the physical plant do not hold
if the system is susceptible to sensor jamming attacks (e.g.,
GPS jamming, electromagnetic interference on sensors etc.).
III. BACKGROUND ON SAFETY CONTROLLER
As we explain in Section IV, a core component of our
approach is the safety controller (SC). Since the properties
of the SC is essential for our approach, we now introduce
this concept and illustrate a method to construct the SC. In
the next section, we will use these concepts to establish the
restart-based protection. For ease of understanding we first
present some useful definitions before describing the details
of SC design.
Definition 1 (Admissible and Inadmissible States). States that
do not violate any of the operational constraints are referred
to as admissible states and denoted by S. Likewise those that
violate the constraints are referred to as inadmissible states
and denoted by S ′.
Definition 2 (Recoverable States). Recoverable states, a
subset of the admissible states, such that if any given SC
starts operations from one of those states, all future states will
remain admissible. The set of recoverable states is denoted by
R.
To implement our restart-based protection approach, one
must construct an SC for the system and find its associated
R. For this, we provide a brief overview of constructing a
SC introduced in earlier literature [29]4. According to this
approach, the SC is designed by approximating the system
with linear dynamics in the form of x˙ = Ax + Bu, for state
vector x and input vector u. In addition the safety constraints
of the physical system are expressed as linear constraints in
the form of H · x ≤ h where H and h are constant matrix
and vector. Consequently, the set of admissible states are
S = {x : H · x ≤ h}.
4Any other design method for constructing an SC and the corresponding
recoverable regionR with the above properties can be utilized for the purpose
of the framework introduced in this paper.
Safety constraints, along with the linear dynamics for the
system are the inputs to a convex optimization problem. These
parameters produce both linear proportional controller gains
K as well as a positive-definite matrix P . The resulting
linear-state feedback controller, u = Kx, yields closed-loop
dynamics in the form of x˙ = (A + BK)x. Given a state
x, when the input u = Kx is used, the P matrix defines a
Lyapunov potential function (xTPx) with a negative-definite
derivative. As a result, for the states where xTPx < 1, the
stability of the linear system is guaranteed using Lyapunov’s
direct or indirect methods. It follows that the states which
satisfy xTPx < 1 are a subset of the safety region. As long
as the system’s state is inside xTPx < 1 and the u = Kx
is the controller, the physical plant will be driven toward the
equilibrium point, i.e., xTPx = 0. Since the potential function
is strictly decreasing over time, any trajectory starting inside
the region xTPx < 1 will remain there for an unbounded time
window. As a result no inadmissible states will be reached.
Hence, the linear-state feedback controller u = Kx is the
SC and R = {x : xTPx < 1} is the recoverable region.
Designing SC in such way ensures that the physical system
would remain always safe [30].
IV. RESTART-BASED PROTECTION
The goal of our proposed restart-based security approach is
to prevent adversaries from damaging the physical plant. The
high-level overview of the proposed approach is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The key idea is that, after a reboot (while the software is
still uncompromised) the time instant to initiate the next restart
must be decided such that the following conditions remain
satisfied:
• From the current time instant until the completion of the
next reboot state will remain inside the admissible region
even if the adversary is in full control and
• The state of the plant after completion of the next reboot
will be such that the SC can stabilize the system.
After every restart (Marker VIII in Fig. 2), the goal is
to set the time of the next restart (Marker VII) such that it
satisfies the above conditions (Marker VI). However, if the
physical plant’s state is too close to the boundary between the
admissible and inadmissible states, there may not exist a time
value that satisfies these conditions – since, in such states, the
system has no tolerance for unexpected behavior and if the
adversary takes over, it can damage the plant in a very short
time. In such cases, the SC remains in charge of the control
(illustrated by Marker V) for longer time and pushes the plant
further into the set of admissible states S (refer to Section III)
until the safety margin is large enough and the restart time can
be calculated (system moves back and forth between states IV
and VI until a restart time is available).
Three challenges need to be addressed for this approach
to be practical. First, we need a mechanism to compute the
next restart time after each reboot. Second, we need to ensure
the integrity of the process that performs this computation.
Third, once the next restart time is computed, a mechanism is
needed to enforce its execution at designated time despite full
adversarial control of the embedded system.
To address the first challenge, an approach for computing
the safe restart time (Marker V in Fig. 2) is presented
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in Section IV-C. To guarantee integrity of restart time
computation (second challenge), we introduce the idea of
secure execution intervals (SEI) as illustrated by Marker III
in Fig 2. After every restart, for a short interval of time,
all the external interfaces of the system remain disabled
(Marker II). This allows the reliable execution of SC and
for trusted computation of the restart time without adversarial
interference. SEI is discussed in more detail in Section IV-A.
Furthermore, to ensure that the intruder cannot prevent the
system from restarting (third challenge), the design includes
a simple, isolated hardware module (illustrated by Marker I)
called Root of Trust (RoT) discussed in Section IV-B.
It is useful to define some parameters before the detailed
discussion on the components. In the rest of this section, Ts
is the length of the SEI and is fixed throughout operation, and
t is the current time. In addition, Tr is the time it takes for
the embedded system to restart and reboot.
A. Secure Execution Interval (SEI)
The need for SEIs arises from the fact that a mechanism
is required to prevent any malicious interference towards the
tasks that are necessary for providing the safety guarantees.
After a restart, while all the external interfaces of the system
remain disabled, the system software is loaded into memory
from a read-only storage unit. Disabling interfaces isolates the
system and protects it from intruders. So long as the system
is isolated, we assume that the software is uncorrupted. SEI
refers to this isolated interval of time after each restart.
During the SEI, two tasks execute in parallel: SC
(which runs periodically to keep the physical system
stable) and FindRestartTime (Section IV-C). If
FindRestartTime cannot find a safe restart time (this
may occur when the physical plant is very close to being
in the inadmissible region), SEI is extended for another Ts
time units5. Extending SEI gives SC more time to push the
state further away from the unsafe boundary and into the
admissible region. If FindRestartTime task is able to
find a restart time, (a) the SetRestartTime interface
of the RoT (details in next section) is used to set the time
for the next restart event, (b) SEI terminates, (c) all the
interfaces are activated, (d) the main controller of the system
is activated and (e) the system enters normal operation mode
– until the next restart takes place. Note that following this
procedure, the SetRestartTime interface of RoT will be
called exactly once before the SEI terminates.
B. Hardware Root of Trust (RoT)
Our design requires a mechanism to ensure that under
any circumstances, the adversary cannot prevent the system
from restarting. Hence, we include an isolated HW module in
charge of triggering restarts and refer to it as hardware root
of trust (RoT).
RoT provides a hardware interface, SetRestartTime,
that during the SEI allows the processor to set the time of
the next restart event. To achieve this, after each restart, RoT
allows the processor to call the SetRestartTime interface
only once. Additional calls to this interface will be ignored.
RoT immediately sets a timer for the time value received from
SetRestartTime interface and issues a restart signal to the
hardware restart pin of the platform upon its expiration.
In order to achieve the security goals of the platform,
ROT needs to be secure and incorruptible. Hence, we
require hardware isolation (e.g., a standalone timer) and
independence from the processor with no connectivity except
for the HW interface setRestartTime. In our prototype
implementation, RoT is implemented using a simple micro-
controller (Section VI).
C. Finding a Safe Restart Time
In this section, we now discuss the implementation of the
FindRestartTime task. This task is activated immediately
after system reboot, along with the SC task and calculates the
time for the next restart event.
Before we proceed, it is useful to define some notations. We
use the notation of Reach=T (x,C) to denote the set of states
that are reachable by the physical plant from an initial set of
states x after exactly T units of time have elapsed under the
control of controller C [8]. Reach≤T (x,C) can be defined as⋃T
t=0 Reach=t(x,C) i.e., set of all the states reachable within
up to T time units. In addition, we use SC to refer to the
safety controller and UC to refer to an untrusted controller,
i.e., one that is compromised by the adversary.
Conditions presented in our newly developed Theorem 3
evaluates whether the system remains safe and recoverable if
restarted after δr time units.
Theorem 3. Assuming that x(t) is the state of the system
at time t and the adversary controls the system (UC)
from t until the restart of the system. Under the following
conditions, the embedded system can be restarted at time
5As we illustrate in Section VI, this extension does not negatively affect
the safety.
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t+δr thus guaranteeing that attacker cannot violate the safety
requirements of the physical plant:
1) Reach≤δr+Tr (x, UC) ⊆ S;
2) Reach≤Tα(Reach=δr+Tr (x, UC), SC) ⊆ S;
3) Reach=Tα(Reach=δr+Tr (x, UC), SC) ⊆ R.
Proof. Intuitively, this condition says that plant remains safe
if, (a) the adversary (UC) cannot reach an inadmissible state
before the next restart completes (δr + Tr), (b) if the safety
controller takes over after next restart, it will avoid unsafe
states until δr + Tr + Tα time units passes and (c) after
δr + Tr + Tα time, a state in R will be safely reached.
To prove formally, assume by contradiction that the system
is not safe under these conditions. Hence, an inadmissible state
is reached at some time. This time will be either less than
δr + Tr, more than δr + Tr and less than δr + Tr + Tα or
more than δr+Tr+Tα. The first two of these cases are ruled
out directly by conditions (1) and (2), so only the third case
needs to be examined.
From properties of SC, Reach≤∞(R, SC) ∩ S ′ = ∅.
Since if R′ ⊆ R, Reach≤∞(R′, SC) ⊆
Reach≤∞(R, SC), the smaller set of states
R′ = Reach=Tα(Reach=δr+Tr (x, UC), SC) ⊆ R will
also satisfy the condition Reach≤∞(R′, SC) ∩ S ′ = ∅.
Therefore, every state reached after δr + Tr + Tα will be
admissible6.
As a direct result of this theorem, after each restart the
safety controller remains in charge until a δr is found
that satisfies the above conditions. Algorithm 1 shows the
pseudo-code of system operation. Lines 4 to 14 represent the
FindRestartTime(x) function which uses the conditions
of Theorem 3 to find a safe restart time.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of system operation
1: Start SC. /* SEI begins */
2: timeFound := False
3: while timeFound == False do
4: x := most recent state of the system from Sensors
5: δcandidate := δinit /* initialize the restart time */
6: startTime = currentTime()
7: while currentTime() - startTime <Ts do
8: if conditions of Theorem 3 are true for δcandidate then
9: δsafe := δcandidate
10: δcandidate := δcandidate + INC STEP /* increase the δcandidate
*/
11: else
12: δcandidate := δcandidate − INC STEP /* decrease the δcandidate
*/
13: end if
14: end while
15: if δsafe > currentTime() - startTime then
16: δsafe = δsafe−(startTime = currentTime())
17: timeFound := True
18: end if
19: end while
20: Send δsafe to RoT. /* Set the next restart time. */
21: Activate external interfaces. /* SEI ends. */
22: Terminate SC and start the main controller.
23: When RoT sends the restart signal to hardware restart pin:
24: Restart the system
25: Repeats the procedure from beginning (e.g., from Line 1)
6This proof is adopted from work [8].
Note that the computation time of each round of
FindRestartTime task (Lines 4 to 14) is capped by Ts
so that it samples the state frequently enough. In addition,
evaluation of the conditions of Theorem 3 in Line 8 requires
finite time and is not instantaneous. To adjust for it, the
elapsed time is deducted from the computed time (Lines 15
to 18) when the restart time is being set in RoT.
It is worth mentioning that in this work, the run-time
computation of reachable states (i.e., Reach function) that is
used in evaluation of the Theorem 3 conditions, is performed
using the real-time reachability technique that is proposed
earlier [8]. This approach uses the model of the system
dynamics (linear or non-linear) to compute reachability. Since
the real actions of the adversary at run-time are unknown
reachability of the system under all possible control values is
calculated (compute reachability under UC). As a result, the
reachable set under UC is the largest set of states that might
be reached from the given initial state, within the specified
time.
V. SECURITY IMPROVEMENT BY RESTARTING ON FIXED
PERIODS
The approach discussed thus far, aims to achieve a very
strong goal for the safety and security of CPS. However, trying
to reach such strong protection guarantees for systems with
fast-moving dynamics or narrow security margin (e.g., UAVs
and power grid components), may result in very short restart
times. Because, such systems can quickly become unstable.
With such short restart times, actions such as establishing
Internet-based communication, authenticating with a remote
server, or performing computationally heavy tasks may be-
come infeasible. In this section, our goal is to demonstrate
that restarting the system, even when the restart time is not
strictly calculated using the approach of Section IV-C, may
improve the security for many systems.
Assume P(t) is the probability of successful damage that
answers to the following question: ”What is the probability
that an attacker succeeds in damaging the system within
certain t time units?”. In this context, damaging the system
refer to the act of forcing the plant to reach a state in
the inadmissible region. Here, t = 0 is the start of system
operation from a functional state. The expected time of
damage is EP(tattack) =
∫∞
0
τP(τ).dτ . A countermeasure is
assumed to improve the security of the system if EPˆ(tattack) <
EP(tattack) where Pˆ(t) and P(t) are the probability of
successful damage with and without that countermeasure in
place. In the rest of this section, we will provide an intuitive
discussion of the types of systems for which periodic restarting
of the system improves the security i.e., reduces the expected
time of attack.
To proceed with the discussion, we assume that F(t) is
the probability density function (PDF) of the successful attack
on the system whose value at any given time represents the
relative likelihood of an attacker being able to cause damage to
the physical system. The relationship between the probability
of a successful attack and its PDF is P(t) = ∫ t
0
F(τ) · dτ .
Further, let us assume that Fˆ(t) is the PDF of a successful
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attack on the same system when it is restarted periodically
every δr times. We have the following:
Fˆ(t) = (1− Pˆ(kδr))F(t− kδr) (1)
where k = bt/δrc. The term (1−Pˆ(kδr)) is the probability of
an attack not taking place in the previous k restart cycles and,
F(t−kδr) is the first δr time units of function F . Integrating
over Equation 1 results in Equation 2 for the probability of
successful attacks with the restart-based protection.
Pˆ(t) = Pˆ(kδr) + (1− Pˆ(kδr))P(t− kδr) (2)
From equations 1 and 2, we can see that Fˆ and Pˆ(t) are only
a function of the values of F ( and consequently P) within
the first δr time units. The effectiveness of the restart-based
approach on reducing probability of damage Pˆ depends on two
main factors: (1) distribution of probability density of the F
within the starting δr segment. In other words, smaller density
of F within the first δr time units leads to a smaller growth
rate of Pˆ which eventually results in a smaller EPˆ(tattack).
And, (2) the second factor is the growth rate of the original P
in the time t > δr (i.e., how does the probability of the attack
without restarts is divided over time).
We further clarify this analysis with the use of four
illustrative systems in the following. Figure 3(a) depicts the
PDF (F , blue line) and probability of damage function (P ,
yellow line) for a demonstrative system. It also depicts the
new damage PDF (Fˆ , red line) and probability of damage
function (Pˆ , purple line) after the periodic restarts with a
period of 20 time units is performed on the system. Notice
that, restarting reduces the probability of damage over the
time for this system (Pˆ < P). Figure 3(b) depicts the same
functions for a different system where the original PDF has a
smaller density within the first 20 time units (µ of the normal
function in Figure 3(b) is larger than Figure 3(a)). As a result
of this difference, Fˆ is overall smaller in Figure 3(b) which
reduces the growth rate of Pˆ in Figure 3(b) compared to 3(a).
This example illustrates that periodic restart-based protection
is more effective on the systems where the probability of
attack/damage is low within the first δr times of the operation.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the F ,P , Fˆ , and Pˆ functions
for two systems where F has the exact same values over
the first 20 time units in both systems. Notice that, the
damage probability function with restarting (Pˆ) is the same
in both systems. However, for the system of Figure 4(a), the
second major attack probability occurs later than the system
of Figure 4(b). As seen in 4(a), function Pˆ has larger values
than P in the range of 100 to 380 time units. This example
illustrates a system where periodic restart-based approach does
not improve the security of the system.
In summary, equations 1 and 2 provide an analytical frame-
work for system designers to utilize F and P functions (that
are properties of the particular system) and evaluate the
effectiveness of restart-based protection for the target systems.
Notice that, there is an extensive body of work in the literature
that studied probabilistic risk assessment of security threats
for various domains and platforms e.g., [28], [6], [24], [17] .
Those results can be utilized to construct F and P functions
for the target systems.
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(b) F is a normal function with µ = 80 time units and δ = 40.
Fig. 3. In both figures, restart time is 20 time units. Restart-based protection
results in a smaller Pˆ in the system of Figure 3(b) (the purple line) because
of the smaller density of function F within the first 20 time units.
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(a) F consists of two normal functions with mean at 30s and 350s and
a standard deviation of 40.
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(b) F consists of two normal functions with mean at 30s and 150s
and a standard deviation of 40.
Fig. 4. In both figures, restart time is 20s and the density of F within the
first 20 seconds is very similar. Restart based protection is more effective in
reducing Pˆ in the system of Figure 4(b) (the purple line).
VI. EVALUATION
We now evaluate various aspects of restart-based protection
approach using a combination of simulation-based and an
actual implementation. To evaluate practicality, we compare
the safe restart times for two target systems, a 3-degree
of freedom helicopter [27] and a warehouse temperature
system [34]. The former is a very unstable system with fast-
moving dynamics and the latter is a relatively stable system
with slower dynamics. In addition, we have implemented a
controller on a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) ZedBoard [7]
embedded platform for a realistic 3DOF helicopter. We
perform platform attacks on the embedded system and
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empirically demonstrate that the helicopter remains safe and
recovers from the attacks.
A. Physical Systems Under Evaluation
1) 3-Degree of Freedom Helicopter:: 3DOF helicopter (dis-
played in figure 7) is a simplified helicopter model, ideally
suited to test intermediate to advanced control concepts and
theories relevant to real-world applications of flight dynamics
and control in the tandem rotor helicopters, or any device with
similar dynamics [19]. It is equipped with two motors that
can generate force in the upward and downward direction,
according to the given actuation voltage. It also has three
sensors to measure elevation, pitch and travel angle as shown
in Figure 7. We use the linear model of this system obtained
from the manufacturer manual [19] for constructing the safety
controller and calculating the reachable set in run-time. Due
to the lack of space, the details of the model are included in
our technical report [2].
For the 3DOF helicopter, the safety region is defined in such
a way that the helicopter fans do not hit the surface underneath,
as shown in Figure 7. The linear inequalities describing the
safety region are provided are −+ |ρ| ≤ 0.3 and |ρ| ≤ pi/4.
Here, variables , ρ, and λ are the elevation, pitch, and travel
angles of the helicopter. Limitations on the motor voltages of
the helicopter are |vl| ≤ 1.1 and |vr| ≤ 1.1 where vl and vr
are the voltage for controlling left and right motors.
2) Warehouse Temperature System:: This system consists
of a warehouse room with a direct conditioner system (heater
and cooler) to the room and another conditioner in the floor.
The safety goal for this system is to keep the temperature of
the room within the range of [20◦C, 30◦C]. This system and its
model are obtained from the work in [34]. Equations 3 and 4
describe the heat transfer between the heater and floor, floor
and the room, and room and outside temperature. The model
assumes constant mass and volume of air and heat transfer
only through conduction.
T˙F = −
UF/RAF/R
mFCpF
(TF − TR) +
uH/F
mFCpF
(3)
T˙R = −
UR/OAR/O
mRCpR
(TR−TO)+
UF/RAF/R
mRCpR
(TF−TR)+
uH/R
mRCpR
(4)
Here, TF , TR, and TO are temperature of the floor, room and
outside. mF and mR are the mass of floor and the air in the
room. uH/F is the heat from the floor heater to the floor and
uH/R is the heat from the room heater to the room both of
which are controlled by the controller. CpF and CpR are the
specific heat capacity of floor (in this case concrete) and air.
UF/R and UR/O represent the overall heat transfer coefficient
between the floor and room, and room and outside.
For this experiment, the walls are assumed to consist of
three layers; the inner and outer wall are made of oak, and
isolated with rock wool in the middle. The floor is assumed
to be quadratic and consists of wood and concrete. The
parameters used are as following7: UR/O = 539.61J/hm2K,
UF/R = 49920J/hm
2K , mR = 69.96kg, mF = 6000kg,
7For the details of calculation of UF/R and UR/O and the values of the
parameters refer to Chapter 2 and 3 of [34].
floor area AF/R = 25m2, wall and ceiling area AR/O =
48m2, thickness of rock wool, oak and concrete in the wall
and floor respectively 0.25m, 0.15m and 0.1m. Maximum
heat generation capacity of the room and floor conditioner
is respectively 800J/s and 115J/s. And, maximum cooling
capacity of the room and the floor cooler is −800J/s and
−115J/s.
B. Safe Restart Time for the Physical Systems
As discussed in the previous sections, after each system
reboot the time of the next restart of the embedded system
needs to be computed. The main factor that impacts the safe
restart time is the proximity of the current state of the plant to
the boundaries of the inadmissible states. In this section, we
demonstrate this point on two physical systems with fast and
slow dynamics; 3DOF helicopter and warehouse temperature
system.
In figures 5 and 6, the calculated safe restart times are
plotted for the two systems under investigation. In these
figures, the red region represents the inadmissible states and
the plant must never reach to those states. If the plant is in
a state that is marked green, it is still undamaged. However,
at some future time it will reach an inadmissible state and
the safety controller may not be able to prevent it. This
is because physical actuators have a limited range and the
maximum capacity of the actuators is not enough to cancel
the momentum and prevent the plant from reaching the unsafe
states. And the gray/black area is the region in which a value
for the safe restart time of the system can be computed. In
this region, the darkness of the color indicates the value of
calculated restart time if the plant is in that state. The black
points indicate the maximum time and the white points are an
indicator of zero time.
(a) Projection of the state space
into the plane ˙ = 0, ρ˙ = 0,
λ = 0, and λ˙ = 0.3Radian/s
(b) Projection of the state space
into the plane ˙ = −0.3Radian/s,
ρ˙ = 0, λ = 0, and λ˙ =
0.3Radian/s
Fig. 5. Calculated safe restarting time for the 3DOF helicopter system from
various states. Darkest black points represent a possible restart time of 1.23
seconds.
In Figure 5, for 3DOF helicopter, the maximum calculated
safe restart time (i.e., the darkest points in the gray region) is
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1.23 seconds. As seen in the Figure, restart time is maximum
in the center where it is farthest away from the boundaries
of unsafe states. In Figure 5(b), the angular elevation speed
of the helicopter is ˙ = −0.3Radian/s. This indicates that
the helicopter is heading towards the surface with the rate
of 0.3 Radian per second. As a result, the plant cannot be
stabilized from the lower elevations levels (i.e., the green
region). Moreover, values of the safe restart times are smaller
in Figure 5(b) compared to the Figure 5(a). Because, crashing
the 3DOF helicopter with the initial downward speed requires
less time than the case without any downward angular velocity.
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Fig. 6. Safe restarting times calculated for the embedded controller system
of warehouse temperature.
Figures 6(a) and 6(a), plot the calculated safe restart times
for the warehouse temperature system. For this system, when
the outside temperature is too high or too low, the attacker
requires less time to take the temperature beyond or bellow
the safety range. One major difference of this system with
the 3DOF helicopter is that due to the slower dynamics, the
safe restart times have values up to 6235s (close to one hour
and forty minutes). In the warehouse system, the rate of the
change of the temperature even when the heater/coolers run
at their maximum capacity is slow and hence, attacker needs
more time to take the system to unsafe states.
If above systems are restarted at times smaller than the cal-
culated safe restart windows, the physical plant is guaranteed
to remain safe under an attacker who gains full control imme-
diately after SEI ends. Achieving this goal is very reasonable
for systems such as the warehouse temperature control and
many other similar systems with applications in Internet of
Things (IoT), city infrastructure, and etc.. For systems with
faster and more unstable dynamics such as the helicopter, the
calculated restart times might become very short. The fast
restart rate, even though theoretically possible, in practice may
create implementation challenges. For instance, initializing a
connection with the remote user over Internet may require
more time than the calculated safe restart time. For our
particular 3DOF controller implementation (Section VII), we
use serial port for communication which has a very small
Regions (From most
common to least Common) Avail.
15<TO <40
0<TO <15 or 40 <TO <60
Temperature
Control
System TO <0 or 60 <TO
%99.9
−+ |ρ| < 0.1 &  < 0.2 & |ρ| < pi/8
0.2< −+ |ρ| < 0.1 & 0.2 <  < 0.3
& pi/8 < |ρ| < pi/6
3DOF
Helicopter
−+ |ρ| < 0.2 & 0.3 <  & pi/6 < |ρ|
%64.3
TABLE I
WEIGHTED AVERAGE AVAILABILITY OF THE EMBEDDED SYSTEM.
initialization overhead. Despite short restart times, we demon-
strate that the system remains stable and functional.
C. Restarting and Embedded System Availability
During the restart, embedded system is unavailable and
actuators keep executing the last command that was received
before the restart occurred. Results of Theorem 3 guarantees
that such unavailability does not compromise safety and
stability of the physical plant. However, low availability may
slow down the progress of the system towards its control
mission. In this section, we measure the average percent of
the time that the embedded system is available when restart-
based protection is implemented. The approach is as follows.
Availability of the controller is the ratio of the time that
the main controller is running (not rebooting and not in SEI)
to the whole operation time of the system. In every restart
cycle, availability is (δr)/(δr + Ts + Tr) where δr is the safe
restart time (main controller is active during δr), Ts is the
length of SEI, and Tr is the reboot time of the embedded
platform. Value of δr is not fixed and changes according to the
state of the plant. To measure availability, we divide the state
space into three sub-regions based on how often the physical
plant is expected to operate in those regions. The availability
values computed for the states in the most common region
are assigned a weight of 1, second most common region a
weight of 0.5 and the least common region a weight of 0.3.
We calculated the expected availability of the controller for
all the states in the operational range of the system. At the
end, the weighted average of the availability was calculated
according to the aforementioned weights. For the value of
the Tr, we used 390ms for the reboot time of the 3DOF
embedded controller (Measured for the ZedBoard [7] used
in the implementation of the controller in next section) and
10s for reboot time of the temperature controller embedded
system (we assumed platform with embedded Linux OS). The
ranges for the regions and obtained availability results are
presented in Table I.
From these results, the impact of our approach on the
temperature control system is negligible. However, there is
a considerable impact on the availability of the helicopter
controller due to frequent restarts. Notice that, the helicopter
system is among the most unstable systems and therefore, one
of the most challenging ones to provide guaranteed protection.
As a result, the calculated results for the helicopter system
can be considered as an approximated upper bound on the
impact of our approach on controller availability among all the
systems.In the next section, we use a realistic 3DOF helicopter
and demonstrate that, despite the reduced the availability, the
plant remains safe and stable and makes progress.
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND ATTACKS
Now, we present an overview of our prototype implemen-
tation of a restart-based protection approach for the control
embedded system of an actual 3DOF helicopter platforms.
More detailed description on the implementation is given in
our technical report [2]. In addition, through hardware-in-
the-loop approach, we use the same embedded system for
controlling the warehouse temperature system. We test some
attacks on both system and verify that the safety requirements
are respected.
Travel
Elevation
Pitch
Main 
Controller
RoT
Restart 
Pin
Voltage
Shifter
Fig. 7. 3DOF helicopter used as the test-bed.
RoT Module:: We implemented the RoT module us-
ing a minimal MSP430G2452 micro-controller on a MSP-
EXP430G2 LaunchPad board [21]. To enable restarting, pin
P2.0 of the micro-controller is connected to the restart input of
the main controller. Internal Timer A of the micro-controller
is used for implementing the restart timer. It is a 16-bit timer
configured to run at a clock rate of 1MHz (i.e., 1µs per
timer count) using the internal digitally controlled oscillator.
A counter inside the interrupt handler of Timer A is used to
extend the timer with an adjustable factor, in order to enable
the restart timer to count up to the required range based on
the application’s needs.
The I2C interface is adopted for the main controller to set
the restart time on RoT module. After each restart, RoT acts as
an I2C slave waiting for the value of the restart time. As soon
as the main controller sends the restart time, RoT disables the
I2C interface and activates the internal timer. Upon expiration
of the timer, an active signal is set on the restart pin to trigger
the restart event and the I2C interface is activated again for
accepting the next restart time.
Main Controller:: We used a Zedboard [7] to implement
the main controller of the 3DOF helicopter and warehouse
temperature control system. Zedboard is a development board
for Xilinx’s Zynq-7000 series all programmable SoC. It
contains a XC7Z020 SoC, 512MB DDR3 memory and an on-
board 256MB QSPI Flash. The XC7Z020 SoC consists of a
processing system (PS) with dual ARM Cortex-A9 cores and a
7-series programmable logic (PL). The processing system runs
at 667MHz. In this evaluation, only one of the ARM cores is
used while the idle one is not activated. The programmable
logic is programmed to provide the I2C and UART interfaces
that are used for connecting to the RoT module and the 3DOF
helicopter.
The main controller runs FreeRTOS [1], a preemptive
real-time operating system. Immediately after the reboot
when the FreeRTOS starts, SafetyController and
FindRestartTime tasks are created and executed.
SafetyController is a periodic task with a period of
20ms (50Hz). And, FindRestartTime is a single task
that executes in a loop, and it only breaks out when a positive
restart time is found. At this point, the restart time is sent to
the RoT module via I2C interface, SafetyController
and FindRestartTime tasks are terminated and the main
control application tasks are created. To calculate reachability
in run-time in function FindRestartTime, we used the
implementation of real-time reachability approach in [8].
Reset pin of Zedboard is connected to RoT module’s reset
output pin. The entire system (both PS and PL) on Zedboard
is restarted when the reset pin is pulled to low state. The boot
process starts when the reset pin is released (returning to high
state). A boot-loader is first loaded from the on-board QSPI
Flash. The image for PL is then loaded by the boot-loader to
program the PL which is necessary for PS to operate correctly.
Once PL is ready, the image for PS is loaded and FreeRTOS
will take over the control of the system.
To further enhance the security of FreeRTOS, we adopt ran-
domization techniques to randomize the following attributes:
(i) the order of the task creation and (ii) task scheduling.
After every restart, we randomize the order of creating the
application tasks. By doing so, the memory allocation is
somewhat shuffled as the memory blocks are assigned to
the tasks dynamically when they are created in FreeRTOS.
Additionally, we port TaskShuffler, a schedule randomization
protocol [37], on FreeRTOS. This technique randomly selects
a task from the scheduler’s ready queue to execute, subject to
each task’s pre-computed priority inversion budget, at every
scheduling point. Randomizing system parameters increases
the difficulty of launching the same attack after each restart.
3DOF Helicopter Controller: The main controller unit
interfaces with the 3DOF helicopter through a PCIe-based
Q8 High-Performance H.I.L. Control and data acquisition
unit [20] and an intermediate Linux-based PC. The PC
communicates with the ZedBoard through the serial port. At
every control cycle, a task on the controller communicates
with the PC to receive the sensor readings (elevation, pitch,
and travel angles) and send the motors’ voltages. The PC
uses a custom Linux driver to send the voltages to the 3DOF
helicopter motors and reads the sensor values. The code for
the controller including the controllers and optimizations to
reduce the boot sequence of ZedBoard is available online [2].
Warehouse Temperature Controller: For system, due
to lack of access to the real physical plant we used a
hardware-in-the-loop approach. Here, the PC runs a simulation
of the temperature based on the heat transfer model of
Equation 3 and 4. Similar to the 3DOF helicopter, the
controller is implemented on the ZedBoard with the exact
same configuration (RoT, serial port connection, I2C interface,
50Hz frequency) as described earlier. Control commands are
sent to the PC, applied to the system and the state is reported
back to the controller.
A. Attacks on the Embedded System
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we
tested three types of synthetic attacks on the implemented
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Fig. 8. Trace of 3DOF Helicopter during two restart cycles when the system
is under worst-case attack that is active immediately after SEI. Green: SEI,
red: system reboot, white: Normal Operation (In this case attacker)
controller of the 3DOF helicopter with actual plant and one
attack on the hardware-in-the-loop implementation of the
warehouse temperature control system.In these experiments,
our focus is on the actions of the attacker after the breach into
the system has taken place. Hence, the breaching approach
and exploitation of the vulnerabilities is not a concern of these
experiments.
In the first attack experiment, we evaluate the protection
provided by our approach in presence of an attacker who,
once activated, is capable of killing the main controller task.
The attack is activated at a random time after the end of SEI.
We observed that under this attack, the 3DOF helicopter did
not hit the surface (i.e., it always remained within the set of
admissible states).
In the second attack experiment, attacker replaces the sensor
readings of the system with corrupted values with the aim of
destabilizing the plant and reducing its progress. The activation
time of this attack, similar to the previous one, is dictated by a
random variable. Similar to the first attack experiment, system
remained safe throughout the attacks. And the progress of the
system was negatively impacted for as the activation time of
the attack became smaller.
In the third attack experiment, we investigate the impact of
a worst-case attacker who becomes active immediately after
the SEI and replaces the original controller with a malicious
process that turns off the fans of the helicopter leading it to hit
the surface. We observed that the system was able to tolerate
this attack and did not hit the surface. The trace of the system
during a time interval of activity is plotted in Figure 8.
From figure, it can be seen the controller spends most of
the time in SEI (red region) or in reboot (white region). This
is due to the fact that this extreme-case attack is activated
immediately after each SEI and destabilizes the helicopter. By
the time that the reboot is complete (end of the white region),
system is close to unsafe states. Hence, SEI becomes longer
as SC is stabilizing the system. under this very extreme attack
model, the system does not make any progress towards its
designated path under this attack model.
In the last experiment, an attack is performed on the
embedded controller of the warehouse temperature. In this
experiment, the outside temperature is set to 45◦C and initial
temperature of the room is set to 25◦C. The attacker takes full
control of the system and immediately after the SEI, activates
both heaters to increase the temperature. We observed that
system restarts before the room temperature goes above 30◦C
and after the restart, SC drives the temperature towards the
safe range.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Suitable Application Targets: Restart-based protection
aims to provide a very strong protection guarantees for the
CPS. However, it is not necessarily applicable to every system.
The main limiting factor is the speed of the dynamics of
the physical plant and the restart time of the embedded
platform. Physical systems that are unstable, have very narrow
safety margin, or have very fast moving dynamics have a
very low tolerance for misbehavior. Adversaries can damage
such systems very quickly. As a result, applying restart-based
protection to such systems would require them to restart
very fast. Very fast restart rates may reduce the controller’s
available time and essentially prevent the system from making
any progress. It may also create implementation challenges;
a system may require some time to establish connection
over Internet or to authenticate that may not be possible if
the system has to restart very frequently. Therefore, before
adapting the proposed mechanism for a system, a set of tests
similar to the evaluations in Section VI-B need to be performed
to check if the restart times are within a suitable range. On
the other hand, systems with slower dynamics and winder
safety margins (e.g., Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
infrastructure, municipal systems, transportation, and etc.) are
the most suitable category to benefit from this technique.
Threat Model: The restart-based approach proposed in this
paper provides guaranteed protection for the physical sub-
system in presence of the attacks. However, attackers may
cause other forms of damage to the system that are not
physical; e.g., attacks targeting performance of the system,
logging and stealing information, and man-in-the middle
attacks. Even though such attacks are not the main focus of
this paper, a similar approach to the analysis of Section V
can be performed to evaluate the effectiveness of restart-based
protection on mitigating the impact of such attacks.
Increasing the Entropy: Despite the effectiveness of
restarting and software reloading in removing the malicious
components from the system, restarting does not fix the
vulnerabilities of the system that provided the opportunity for
the intruder to breach into the system. An attacker maybe
able to re-launch the same attack after the restart and gain
control of the system. It turns out, randomizing parameters
and operation of the system introduces a noise in the execution
pattern of the system within each cycle, thereby, increasing the
time and effort needed by the attacker to trigger the attack. In
other words, randomization reduces the impact of previous
knowledge in launching new attacks. There is a considerable
body of work on various randomization techniques for
security protection; e.g., schedule Randomization [37], address
space randomization (ASLR) [32], and Kernel Address Space
Randomization (KASLR) [22].
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IX. RELATED WORK
The idea of restarting the entire system or its components
at run-time has been explored in earlier research in two
forms of (i) revival (i.e., reactively restart a failed component)
and (ii) rejuvenation (i.e., prophetically restart functioning
components to prevent state degradation). Authors in literature
[9] introduce recursively restartable systems as a design
paradigm for highly available systems and uses a combination
of revival and rejuvenation techniques. Earlier research [10],
[12], [11] illustrate the concept of microreboot that consists
of having fine-grain rebootable components and trying to
restart them from the smallest component to the biggest
one in the presence of faults. Others in literature [36],
[15], [18] focus on failure and fault modeling and trying
to find an optimal rejuvenation strategy for various systems.
The above cited works are proposed for traditional (i.e.,
non safety-critical) computing systems such as servers and
switches and are not directly applicable to safety-critical CPS.
However, they demonstrate that the concept of restarting
the system is considered as a reliable method to recover a
faulty/compromised system.
In the context of safety-critical systems, authors proposed to
utilize restarting as a recovery method from SW bugs/faults
for safety-critical applications using an additional HW unit
as a back up controller during the restart [4]. Unlike
ours, the architecture is only concerned with fault-tolerance
and the security aspect of the safety-critical CPS was not
addressed. Other work exists [5] where the authors propose
the procedures to design a controller (referred to as base
controller) that enable the entire computing system to be safely
restarted at run-time. Base Controller keeps the system inside
a subset of safety region by updating the actuator input at least
once after every system restart. Similar to the previous work,
this work is also concerned with the fault-tolerance and cannot
provide any guarantees in presence of an adversary. Further
work [3] leverages the idea of restarting to improve security
of safety-critical real-time systems. However, it requires an
additional customized hardware unit to execute a back up
controller during the restart to maintain the plant’s stability.
Our approach provides guaranteed safety for the plant and is
implementable on single COTS embedded system. While the
idea of restarting the embedded system is explored in earlier
research for fault-tolerance, to the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first comprehensive work to utilize system-
wide restarts and physical dynamics of the system to provide
security for safety-critical CPS.
There is a considerable overlap between real-time systems
and safety-critical embedded CPS. The problem of studying
various There are recent works that study the problem
of attack protection and detection approaches in real-time
systems. Recent work [25], [38], [39] on dual-core based
hardware/software architectural frameworks aim to protect
RTS against security vulnerabilities. In literature [26] authors
leverage the deterministic execution behavior of RTS and
use Simplex architecture [31] to detect intrusion while
guaranteeing the safety. Despite the improved security, all
these techniques have false negatives and do not provide
any guarantees. In contrast, our restart-based mechanism
guarantees that the attacker cannot damage the physical sub-
system.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we aim to decouple the safety requirements
of the physical plant from the security properties. Because
of inertia, pushing a physical plant from a given (potentially
safe) state to an unsafe state – even with complete adversarial
control – is not instantaneous and often takes finite (even
considerable) time. We leverage this property to calculate a
safe operational window and combine it with the effectiveness
of system-wide restarts to decrease the efficacy of malicious
actors. Designers of such safety-critical systems can now
evaluate the necessary trade-offs between control system per-
formance and increased security guarantees – thus improving
the overall design of embedded CPS in the future.
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